There are many challenges confronting DDR programmes in station struggle provinces. In this essay I will look chiefly at the struggle in Sierra Leone and the challenges that DDR faced during the peace procedure at that place. However, I will do comparings with other struggle provinces, such as Liberia and the DRC, when it offers utile analysis. I will get down by giving a brief overview of how the DDR programme was instigated in Sierra Leone. I will so look at the challenges posed by regional issues that threaten to worsen existing tensenesss. Following I will look at the policy of ‘one adult male, one gun ‘ and analyze the possible strengths and failings of implementing eligibility demands of this sort. When this is established I will look at the challenges confronting the reintegration stage of DDR and particularly that of accomplishment development and civilian reintegration. Last I will measure the extended challenges posed by kid soldiers, and in peculiar misss, on all phases of DDR. I will reason with a sum-up of how DDR can get the better of the challenges discussed. There are other cardinal challenges to the success of DDR that due to the length of this essay I will non be able to cover but that would merit equal attending. These include issues of support on all phases of DDR, and particularly the ‘R ‘ stage, and the challenges posed by the use of financess and resources by politicians and Rebel leaders.

The Sierra Leone civil war started in 1991. By 1997, 50 % of the population was internally displaced, Rebel groups controlled more than half of the state, and Sierra Leone was recorded as holding the lowest Human Development Index of any state by the UNDP ( Bradley et al. 2002 ) . However, by 2002 the state was good on its manner to reconstructing order through peaceable dialogues ( ibid ) . HumH

This has been hailed by many as being, in portion, down to a successful DDR programme ( UN Conference Report 2005: 4 ) . It started in 1997 with the first of three stages. The 2nd stage began in October 1999 with the execution of the Lome peace understanding. The 3rd stage ran from May 2001 to January 2002. Altogether the three stages lasted four old ages, during which 72,500 battlers were disarmed and demobilized ; 42,330 arms and 1.2 million pieces of ammo were collected and destroyed ( Bradley et al. 2002 ) . The Sierra Leone DDR programme has been upheld by many as an illustration to the remainder of Africa of how DDR can help the long-run peace procedure ( UN Conference Report 2005: 4 ) . However, as will be shown, the DDR procedure in Sierra Leone was non without its jobs.

Throughout the last two decennaries, struggles in West Africa have all had strong regional dimensions ( Gislesen 2006: 20 ) – Sierra Leone is no exclusion. This has resulted in large-scale cross boundary line motions of weaponries and battlers, which has doubtless exacerbated bing tensenesss in the part and aided the prolonging of the struggles within ( ibid ) . ‘Often battlers have demobilised in one state, merely to re-emerge as battlers in a neighbouring struggle ‘ ( Gislesen 2006: 20 ) . The danger here is that a blemished DDR procedure in one state could ‘release ‘ former battlers to other states and struggles in the part ( ibid ) . This was seen in Liberia, where some of the kid soldiers involved in the combat during the eruption in 2002 and 2003 had come from Sierra Leone ( Gislesen 2006: 20 ) . ‘They had either failed to travel through DDR or had non been decently reintegrated, and were easy re-recruited due to geographical propinquity ‘ ( Lahai 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 20 ) . Further challenges that stem from the cross-border motion of battlers are that many effort to profit from the DDR programmes twice ( Gislesen 2006: 20 ) . This puts an extra fiscal and logistical strain on DDR programmes, which could compromise their effectivity. In order to get the better of these challenges DDR programmes must take regional deductions into history. Sierra Leone made paces towards edifice dealingss with its neighbors ( Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia ) nevertheless, there needs to be a regional focal point in the planing stage of a DDR programme to turn to the root causes of the struggle and efficaciously demobilise and reintegrate the different groups involved, to the different countries in the part ( UN Conference Report 2005: 5 ) . The peace procedure in a part as a whole is merely every bit of import as for a individual state such as Sierra Leone. Indeed, ‘the presence of armed battlers in any state in the West Africa sub-region does non portend good for the stableness of all ‘ ( UNDDR Resource Centre ) .

Disarming is of import becomes it removes one of the major tools of force ( Gislesen 2006: 13 ) . However, uncomplete or partial disarming can sabotage DDR attempts and have destabilizing effects on the overall peace procedure ( as was seen in Liberia in the 1990s ) ( see Gislesen 2006: 13 ) . To battle this job the policy of ‘one adult male, one arm ‘ was introduced ( See Malan 2000: 12 ) . However, holding this as the lone eligibility demand for DDR has led many battlers to see demobilization as a ‘weapons-buy-back ‘ programme ( Kai-Kai 2001: 121 ) . In other words, people distribute and buy weaponries cheaply and so interchange them for money at a disarming site ( Gislesen 2006: 13 ) . Alongside this it could increase the regional motion of arms if battlers attempt to demilitarize in the part that offers the best DDR benefits ( ibid ) – As was seen in Sierra Leone and Liberia ( ibid ) .

The ‘one adult male, one arm ‘ policy has besides more frequently than non led to the exclusion of kid soldiers, particularly misss, from come ining DDR programmes. Girls frequently did n’t transport arms whilst attach toing the combat forces or their leaders would give their arms to adult friends or relations so that they could have the DDR benefits alternatively ( Gislesen 2006: 13 ) . DDR in Liberia attempted to relieve this issue by leting people to demilitarize without showing a arm. Alternatively they could come in demobilization cantonments by passing over 150 unit of ammunitions of ammo ( International Crisis Group 2004: 10 ) . This was enormously debatable. The lowering of eligibility demands, coupled with a US $ 300 wage out for reintegration, alongside a deficiency of social-stigma attached to ex-combatants in Liberia, provided a powerful motive for many battlers, and civilians, to come in the demobilization cantonments ( Paes 2005: 257 ) . This hyperbolic caseload of donees is non needfully a bad thing, but UNMIL did non hold the fiscal support to cover with the immense inflow of battlers seeking to demobilize ( ibid ) .

The DDR programme in Sierra Leone besides attempted to turn to the challenge of female battlers and cantonment followings by presenting group disarming. Although this allowed female battlers and kids to ‘demobilise ‘ it gave Rebel leaders the chance to keep back arms and ‘falsify ‘ the Numberss of battlers and weaponries being turned in ( Bradley et al. 2002 ) . Consequently, group disarming left big Numberss of arms in circulation which raised serious concerns about a return to force ( DPKO 2003: 25 ) . However, leting kids to come in DDR without showing a arm is, despite the possible security deductions, the lone manner of guaranting that kid soldiers are included in the procedure ( Gislesen 2006: 13 ) . Of class it was non merely the instance that a kid could roll into a disarming site and be accepted. In order to divide kids who had merely been displaced from their households and those who were involved with the combat forces there were certain trials they could take. For case, showing suited cognition of how to utilize a fire-arm every bit good as showing cognition of the combat forces themselves ( Robertshaw 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 14 ) . Girls who had been sexually abused were eligible for DDR regardless of whether or non they had cognition of how to utilize a gun. However misss were improbable to come frontward in fright of stigmatization ( Edward Juma Abu 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 14 ) . Consequently, the bulk of female kid soldiers in Sierra Leone were excluded from DDR as they were merely labelled as ‘dependants ‘ , or ‘camp followings ‘ , instead than battlers ( Gislesen 2006: 14 ) .

During the Disarmament phase of DDR there is a quandary between seeking to include as many kid soldiers as possible, and, collect as many arms as possible. There needs to be a cosmopolitan alteration in policy to let kid soldiers to inactivate with or without give uping a arm ( Gislesen 2006: 49 ) . Eligibility demands need to be carefully and clearly defined at the start of a DDR programme and non altered during the procedure – as was seen in Liberia. Whilst ‘One adult male, one arm ‘ standard can prise off Rebels from their groups it can be considered ‘aggressive ‘ and ‘unfriendly ‘ by Rebel commanding officers ( Bradley et al. 2002 ) . Group disarming is a faster and more efficient procedure but it does let commanding officers to pull strings the Numberss of battlers and weaponries traveling through DDR, and leaves big Numberss of arms in circulation ( Bradley et al. 2002 ) . Thus the challenge confronting DDR programmes is how to demobilize as many battlers as possible and yet cod and destroy as many arms as possible. This is a equilibrating act of which there is no universally agreed solution.

The reintegration stage of DDR in Sierra Leone started in late 2000/2001 ( about a twelvemonth after the disarming and demobilization stage ended ) ( UNDDR Resource Centre ) . By 2002, 56,700 ex-combatants had registered for reintegration preparation. By the clip the reintegration stage had ended ( January 2004 ) 51,122 ex-combatants had been through trade accomplishment developing including, woodworking, masonry, and orienting ( ibid ) . However this preparation merely lasted six months. This was clearly non long plenty to sufficiently supply ex-combatants with the cognition and experience necessary to realistically vie in the labor market. When this is coupled with the fact that there was still favoritism against ex-combatants in the labor market it is non surprising that many of them were unable to happen work ( UNDDR Resource Centre ) . Furthermore, Sierra Leone ‘s ‘desperate ‘ economic state of affairs meant there was really few occupations for anyone in the state station struggle, allow entirely ex-combatants ( Sesay and Suma 2008 ) . Sierra Leone was non the lone station struggle province that had jobs with its reintegration stage. In the Ituri part in the DRC, some 10,000 ex-combatants had to wait 10 months before civilian reintegration programmes became available ( Amnesty International 2007: 17 ) . Consequently, by the terminal of 2005, around two tierces of ex-combatants remained unemployed in the part ( UN S/2005/506: 5 ) . For both Sierra Leone and the DRC this was enormously debatable given that ex-combatants are more likely to take up weaponries once more without chances for long-run socio-economic chances ( ibid ) . To get the better of this challenge it is necessary for DDR programmes to work aboard other station struggle processes to better the environment in which freshly trained ex-combatants are seeking work. Alongside this there must be equal financess and resources to sufficiently develop those who volunteer for reintegration services.

There are legion challenges confronting the successful DDR of kid soldiers. These include, the troubles of following their households, the troubles of making feasible chances station demobilization, how to re-integrate child battlers who were non involved straight in warfare, issues of disease and malnutrition, the particular demands of miss soldiers, the jobs of kid soldiers demobilizing as grownups, and covering with psychological injury. In order for DDR to be successful it must turn to all these challenges. Child soldiers have received small attending from the academic community sing post-conflict Reconstruction and peace-building, despite the fact that kid soldiers have constituted one tierce of all contending forces in West Africa ( Gislesen 2006: 4 ) . For this ground many DDR programmes have overlooked the intricate challenges that child soldiers present to the peace procedure. Indeed, ‘The reintegration of former kid soldiers is the most complex and most time-consuming portion of all DDR ‘ ( Gislesen 2006: 23 ) . In order to turn to these challenges at that place foremost needs to be cosmopolitan understanding on what defines a ‘child soldier ‘ . The Cape Town Principles defines a kid soldier as ‘any individual under 18 old ages of age who is portion of any sort of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity ‘ ( UNICEF 1997: Definitions ) . Therefore this includes kids recruited as cooks, porters, couriers, and misss recruited for sexual intents. However merely puting eligibility demands for kid soldiers is non plenty to guarantee that they are suitably demobilised and reintegrated.

Donald Robertshaw, Child Protection Officer at UNICEF, claimed that the little Numberss of kids traveling through DDR in Sierra Leone was non because they were being turned away for neglecting to run into eligibility demands, but instead that they were merely non coming to the demobilization sites ( Robertshaw 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 15 ) . In Sierra Leone, ‘it is estimated that there have been every bit many as 10,000-15,000 kid Soldiers ‘ ( ibid ) , yet merely 6,845 went through the DDR procedure ( Aboagye and Bah 2004: 9 ) . The disagreement between estimated kid soldiers and DDR participants can be seen most notably in the instance of miss soldiers. ‘Girls have been associated with all the armed groups that are present in Sierra Leone ‘ ( SC-UK, 2005: 7 ) . In fact, it is estimated that around 30 % of kid soldiers in Sierra Leone were misss ( Mazurana et al. 2002: 107 ) . Despite this, really few misss go through DDR – merely 8 % of kid soldiers who participated in DDR in Sierra Leone were misss ( Robertshaw 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 15 ) . Furthermore, UNICEF estimates that around 3,000 misss who were eligible for DDR did non even come forward to be registered ( UNICEF 2005a: 16 ) .

So the challenge becomes, why do kid soldiers, and particularly girl soldiers, non come to the demobilization sites? In some instances it is a misinterpretation of eligibility. Harmonizing to Gislesen, many kids thought that merely those over 18, those who carried a gun, or those who were straight involved in the armed struggle were eligible ( Gislesen 2006: 16 ) . There is besides grounds to propose that many kids were ‘manipulated ‘ and ‘deliberately misinformed ‘ by their Rebel leaders sing their eligibility for DDR ( ibid ) . In Sierra Leone, many Rebel leaders were fearful of persecution if they were found to hold recruited child soldiers and therefore attempted to either forestall them inactivating or convinced them to demobilize as grownups ( SC-UK, 2005: 9 ) . Francis Lahai, Child Protection Officer at the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children ‘s Affairs ( MSWGCA ) , says this was common amongst the Kamarjos and CDF, who claimed they had no kids in their groups out of fright of persecution ( Lahai 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 16 ) . Consequently it is likely that many of the kid soldiers associated with these groups have non come frontward for DDR. Furthermore, many leaders prevented girl soldiers from traveling through DDR because they were valuable in the post-conflict period ( Gislesen 2006: 16 ) . ‘Whilst boy battlers are of small value to leaders post-conflict, misss can be used as domestic workers, sexual slaves, cooks and “ married womans ” ‘ ( Twum-Danso 2003: 11 ) .

There are besides challenges confronting the success of DDR in kid soldiers sing reintegration. In Sierra Leone grownup battlers were offered a ‘Transitional Safety Net Allowance ‘ ( TSA ) of $ 600, paid in episodes, during the civilian reintegration procedure ( Gislesen 2006: 18 ) . In Liberia, the NCDDRR included child ex-combatants in its TSA payments, whilst Sierra Leone offered child ex-combatants rehabilitation services alternatively. These included three months of ‘psychosocial guidance, personal supplies, household tracing, and reunion support ‘ . Long term support included ‘placement in schools, developing chances and benefits from community reintegration programmes ‘ ( Gislesen 2006: 18 ) . In Sierra Leone it was believed that hard currency benefits to kids would merely stop up in the custodies of their Rebel leaders or would give out the feeling that utilizing kids as battlers would ensue in a hard currency “ wages ” ( Caritas Makeni 2006 ) . However, merely giving hard currency benefits to adults creates a challenge all the same. Many child soldiers were tempted by the instant hard currency benefits awarded to grownups as opposed to the long term accomplishments preparation and instruction chances and therefore demobilised as grownups alternatively. This job is farther exacerbated when it is considered that many leaders force their kid battlers to inactivate as grownups anyhow due to fear of persecution for enrolling them ( Gislesen 2006: 18 ) . In order to get the better of the challenge of kid soldiers inactivating as grownups, DDR must include immature grownups in their kid reintegration programmes. In the universes of the UN Secretary General, ‘some of the cardinal programmes available to kids in the DDR procedure, peculiarly psychosocial guidance, household reunion, and educational chances, should besides be made available to immature grownups who were late child soldiers ‘ ( UN Doc. S/2004/200 ) . Alongside this DDR programmes must work with other peace edifice procedures, such as truth and rapprochement committees, so that Rebel commanding officers do non forestall their kid battlers from come ining disarming cantonments out of fright of persecution.

Another outstanding challenge comes when trying to reunite child ex-combatants with their households. Many households have either been killed or forced to fly their places during a struggle ( Gislesen 2006: 34 ) . Even when a kid ‘s household has been found there are many challenges confronting their credence as households frequently have to be convinced to accept the return of their kids ( ibid ) . Many communities reject child ex-combatants based on the atrociousnesss they committed during the struggle, frequently to their ain communities. This was a tactic employed by groups such as the RUF in Sierra Leone in order to guarantee their kid soldiers have no place to return to if they escaped ( ibid ) and therefore let them to be re-recruited post-DDR.

Child soldiers frequently enter demobilization sites with extended psychological and physical injury ( Gislesen 2006: 27 ) . The deductions on reintegration are hence complex. As the NCDDR notes, ‘Socio-economic reintegration of kid battlers is the most critical component of the DDR programme ‘ ( ES-NCDDR, 2000: 11 ) . However, despite their ordeals, many kid soldiers can be rehabilitated if provided with the correct targeted psychological support. Of class failure to make so could hold profound effects on the security of the kid and society as a whole ( see MSF, 2000: 5 ) . Therefore, despite being a immense fiscal and logistical project, it is indispensable to turn to the psychosocial demands of kid ex-combatants as portion of the reintegration procedure. ( Gislesen 2006: 27 ) .

This is non a simple project. As Dyregrov et Al. justly states, ‘Diagnosing PTSD is about nonmeaningful in many states, because single intervention is non executable ‘ ( Dyregrov et al 2002: 139 ) . This was apparent in Sierra Leone – where there was merely one professionally qualified head-shrinker to cover with the legion instances of PTSD in child ex-combatants ( Gbla, 2003: 182 ) . Furthermore, trained professionals where centred in the major metropoliss and were therefore unaccessible to the bulk of child soldiers from rural countries ( Gislesen 2006: 30 ) . This challenge is exacerbated farther when one considers ‘separated kids ‘ . In Sierra Leone, alongside the 7,000 kids who participated in DDR, 5,000 kids who could non show cognition of utilizing a piece were labelled ‘separated kids ‘ as opposed to ‘child soldiers ‘ ( Robertshaw 2006 in Gislesen 2006: 17 ) . These ‘separated kids ‘ were so re-united with their households without having the same psychological rehabilitation available to demobilised kid soldiers ( Gislesen 2006: 17 ) . This is debatable as it is likely many kids involved with armed groups have been reintegrated as ‘separated kids ‘ and yet have suffered likewise traumatic experiences as kid soldiers, without the psychological support ( ibid ) . To get the better of this DDR programmes must supply all Children associated with armed groups with psychological rehabilitation. Although this may be fiscal hard, it is necessary to guarantee the security of both reintegrated kids and society as a whole.

There are besides challenges sing the physical injury kid soldiers demobilise with. These include Malnutrition, disease, gestation, STIs, drug dependences, and a broad scope of physical hurts that all demand to be addressed during DDR ( Gislesen 2006: 17 ) . West African states suffer from a serious deficiency of wellness attention substructure to undertake the physical and psychological issues many child soldiers have ( ibid ) . However, procedures in Sierra Leone have shown that in the absence of wellness attention professionals, recreational and self-help activities can be effectual at battling psychological injury. Recreational and cultural procedures have non merely helped turn to single kids ‘s psychosocial demands but have besides helped with community peace edifice by conveying together assorted groups ( Gislesen 2006: 50 ) .

Clearly there are many challenges confronting the success of DDR programmes. In order to get the better of these challenges DDR programmes must reform. The bulk of struggles in West Africa have regional deductions. Therefore DDR programmes must be coordinated across boundary lines and take these issues into consideration to cut down the cross-border motion of weaponries and battlers that exacerbate struggles. ‘One adult male, one gun ‘ is non a sufficient eligibility demand for disarming. Although it reduces the handiness of arms during a struggle it does non guarantee that all participants of armed groups have entree to DDR, such as adult females and kids. There needs to be a cosmopolitan alteration in policy to let kid soldiers to inactivate with or without give uping a arm. DDR must besides account for kid soldiers who demobilise as grownups. Failure to make this could hold potentially destructive effects for the security of the kid and society at big. DDR must be designed to suit the substructure it is working within. For case if there is a terrible deficiency of professionally qualified staff to cover with injury in child ex-combatants so the reintegration stage of DDR must admit this and integrate other methods of rehabilitation such as the recreational and self-help activities that were successful in Sierra Leone. Overall, In Sierra Leone, there was far more clip and money given to the disarming and demobilization phases of the DDR programme than the reintegration phase ( UNDDR Resource Centre ) . Consequently the preparation offered during the reintegration procedure was non sufficient to supply ex-combatants with the accomplishments needed to be competitory in the labor market. Alongside Sierra Leone ‘s desperate economic province, there were few occupations available anyhow, allow entirely for ex-combatants who continued to be discriminated against. To get the better of this DDR must procure equal resources and funding for the reintegration procedure and supply ex-combatants with the accomplishments they need to reintegrate into civilian society and non merely rejoin the armed groups out of a deficiency of socio-economic chances.

Ultimately DDR focuses on the disarming and demobilisation of ex-combatants. However for there to be any possibility of long term peace and stableness ex-combatants must be reintegrated into a operation and well-governed society. Therefore DDR programmes must be implemented alongside other broader station struggle Reconstruction models and non merely initiated in a vacuity on their ain. Furthermore DDR should be accompanied by other alleviation, relocation, and rehabilitation programmes focused on a broader context of war-effected populations. These should include local communities, every bit good as security sector reforms ( SSR ) . There is no uncertainty that Sierra Leone is one of the more successful illustrations of how DDR can help the overall peace procedure, nevertheless, there are still lessons learnt that should be acknowledged by future DDR programmes.