The Earth ‘s clime is ever altering, and has ever been the greatest influence on the life environment. It was merely until really late, geologically-speaking, that life developed the ability to force back ; to alter non merely the environment, but climate itself. There are widely discernible effects ; such as alterations to the landscape, species devastation and the pollution of air and H2O. There are besides more contested charges ; that human activity is responsible for broad climatic issues such as planetary heating. Scientific consensus now agrees that humanity is most likely the cause for recent rapid additions in planetary temperatures ( IPCC 2007 ) and much of the incrimination is placed on the monolithic sum of CO2 that human civilization pumps into the ambiance. There are many solutions being proposed to undertake this issue ; one with the most possible being the policy instrument of market-based emanations trading. The largest and most intricate version of this policy implemented to day of the month is the European Union ‘s Emission Trading Scheme. With all its wide-reaching potency, it is still basically an experiment ; one confronting legion challenges to its success. The EU ETS has the possible to act upon hereafter, planetary enterprises, and it is up to the participants and stakeholders to utilize these challenges as formative lessons ; to be argus-eyed, adaptable and forward thought. The purpose of this paper is to present the EU ETS, discuss its formation and construction, asses its major challenges and propose solutions traveling frontward.
The construct of emanations trading was ab initio introduced 43 old ages ago by the Canadian economic expert John H. Dales. His thought of “ markets in pollution rights ” ( Dales 1968 ) was considered extremist at the clip, but is now one of the most of import and widely recognized policy instruments for undertaking the challenges of pollution and clime alteration. The EU ETS is non the first execution of this instrument, but it is surely the largest and most complicated embodiment to day of the month. Its beginnings are interesting and surely deserving researching.
In some ways, the EU ETS was born out failure. Without using the lessons learnt from the errors of the yesteryear, it is about impossible to travel on to win in the hereafter. This is exemplified rather poetically by Nietzsche, who suggests:
Analyze the lives of the best and most fruitful people and peoples and inquire yourselves whether a tree that is supposed to turn to a proud tallness can distribute with bad conditions and storms ; whether bad luck and external opposition, some sorts of hatred, green-eyed monster, obstinacy, misgiving, hardness, greed, and force do non belong among the favorable conditions without which any great growing even of virtuousness is barely possible. ( Nietzsche 1882 )
There are two major failures that led to the birth of the EU ETS. The first was the European Commission ‘s 1992 C energy revenue enhancement proposal. Although well-meaning, the proposal was sharply opposed by several Member States and by the chief industry anterooms. The lesson learnt from this steadfast resistance is that although emanations revenue enhancements may work on a national degree, internationally-imposed revenue enhancements are rapidly contested as a slippery-slope onslaught on sovereignty. The proposal was officially withdrawn in 1997 ( Convery et al. 2008, p.7 ) .
The 2nd failure began in late 1997 ; when Vice President Al Gore, leader of the US deputation negociating the Kyoto Protocol, successfully forced emanations merchandising into the dialogues. The EU negotiants strongly opposed emanations trading, fearing that the United States had introduced the policy as a agency to detain dialogues. The Europeans besides believed that the system was excessively complicated to implement within the specified clip graduated table, and that marketable licenses would be viewed as a ‘right to foul ‘ and as ‘trading in indulgences ‘ ( Grubb et al. 1999, p.92 ) . Washington successfully used emanations merchandising to keep the dialogues surety, endangering to retreat from Kyoto if it was non included ( Braun 2009, p.472 ) . Although Kyoto was signed on December 11, 1997, the European negotiating squad felt that they had failed to accomplish their ends and rapidly moved on to other undertakings. Six months subsequently, new leading at the Commission eventually began to encompass emanations merchandising. In delicious sarcasm, it took the failed effort to contend against emanations merchandising for the Commission to get down to gain its potency.
Although academic treatment of emanations trading had been heating up for several decennaries, it was non until the 2000 publication of the “ Green Paper on GHG Emissions Trading ” by the European Commission that the topic was earnestly considered as a cardinal portion of European clime policy ( Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2007, p.68 ) . In another dosage of sarcasm, it was non until 2001, when newly-appointed President George W. Bush out of the blue pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol, that existent frontward impulse began to happen on emanations merchandising in Europe. This international dialogues crisis, combined with the failure at the 6th Conference of the Parties ( Braun 2009, p.472 ) , “ united Europe and triggered farther involvement in the constitution of an EU-wide market in GHG licenses ” ( Zapfel & A ; Vainio 2002, p.12 ) . It was around this clip that the bill of exchange EU ETS proposal was submitted for consideration ( Convery et al. 2008, p.7-8 ) . Before the EU ETS program could be finalised and implemented, more experimentation and experience was required. That being said, there are a few plans that are surely deserving adverting in relation to the beginnings of the EU ETS. They provided cardinal experience to EU policymakers, helped do emanations merchandising a more familiar construct, and in some ways shaped the EU ETS into what it is today.
The first plan is the UK Emissions Trading Scheme ( UK ETS ) , launched in April 2002. The UK ETS had an initial lifetime of 5 old ages and was closed to new entrants in 2009. Unlike the EU ETS, the UK ETS regulates the six different types of nursery gases ( GHGs ) outlined in the Kyoto Protocol. It provides flexibleness to single houses, with the purpose of understating the costs and encouraging engagement. Furthermore, it rather blatantly aimed to name London as the cardinal fiscal market for the trading of environmental licenses ( Smith & A ; Swierzbinski 2007, p.135 ) . Although the UK ETS was the first in Europe to cover multiple industries, it was non the first emanations merchandising strategy on the continent.
The first cap-and-trade strategy in Europe was launched in Denmark. In March of 1999, the Folketing ( Danish Parliament ) signed into jurisprudence a major Electricity Reform. In add-on to several alterations to the overall administration of the industry, tradable CO2 emanation allowances were introduced for the 2000-2003 period ( Pederson 2001, p.224 ) . This plan differed from the EU ETS in that it was limited to the electricity-generating sector ; yet it was the first in the universe to specifically aim CO2, emanations, and was an of import stepping rock in the development of policies in the EU ETS. The concluding emanations trading strategy which is relevant to discussion n relation to the beginning of the EU ETS comes from a surprising participant ; non another state, but from British Petroleum ( BP ) , one of the largest energy companies in the universe.
On May 19th 1997, John Browne, the Group Chief Executive at BP, delivered a address at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business. His address communicated that BP would no longer deny the climb grounds that nursery gases have an impact on the Earth ‘s clime. He went on to plight that BP would take a base and command their emanations ( Victor & A ; House 2006, p.1 ) . This was the first clip a major energy company acknowledged clime alteration – even if it was an obvious effort at green rebranding. Browne announced in 1998 a Kyoto-inspired mark for internal decrease of 10 % below 1990 degrees, a figure perchance chosen as the norm between the EU ‘s proposal of 15 % and the signed norm of 5 % ( McKibbin & A ; Wilcoxen 1997 ) . BP moved on to make an internal planetary GHG emanations merchandising system in 1999, to a great extent advised by Environmental Defense, and had their baseline informations verified externally. Allotments were based on historic emanations informations ( from 1998 ) and banking was allowed in order to supply a safety cyberspace for future alterations. BP successfully achieved their mark in 2001, 7 old ages earlier than ab initio forecasted. In 2002 they entered into the abovementioned UK ETS and in 2003 they used their experience with emanations merchandising to actively prosecute in developing ordinances for the EU ETS ( Victor & A ; House 2006 ; Proegler 2005 ) . Whether BP ‘s motives are green or black, their influence on the development of the EU ETS can non be ignored.
The EU ETS is frequently referred to as the “ Grand Policy Experiment ” ( Kruger & A ; Pizer 2004 ; Skj?rseth 2009 ; Sandoff et Al. 2009 ) , yet it is of import to observe that this phrase was originally coined in 1998 by Robert Stavins, in mention to the Acid Rain Program ( ARP ) ; an SO2 emanations merchandising enterprise launched in the United States on January 1, 1995 ( Stavins 1998 ; Easton 2006 ) . Possibly history will look back on it as the first Grand Policy Experiment in a series of Grand Policy Experiments that will finally germinate into a planetary clime government. Optimisms aside, the ARP played a major function in the design of the EU ETS. There are, without a uncertainty, several major differences between the two strategies.
The ARP and the EU ETS differ at first glimpse in footings of sheer size. The EU ETS covers approximately 12,000 beginnings, approximately four times the 3,000 covered by the American predecessor. Although comparing CO2 to SO2 is much like comparing apples to oranges, the face value pre-program emanations degrees are enormously different. The ARP began by covering about 15 million metric dozenss of SO2. This represents merely 0.75 % of the 2 billion metric dozenss of CO2 covered by the EU ETS. The entire value of distributed allowances besides shows a major difference in graduated table, at $ 41 billion for the EU ETS versus $ 5 billion for the ARP. Another major difference between the two strategies is the cardinal administration of their execution. The EU ETS is extremely decentralised, while the ARP is extremely centralised. This difference is straight related to the built-in challenges of such a transnational enterprise. This comparing is based on 2007 figures, and is extremely drawn from the work of Ellerman and Buchner ( 2007, p.68 ) . As discussed, design of the EU ETS was inspired from several beginnings. The really design and range of the Scheme make it vulnerable to a figure of jobs. Before they can be discussed ; it is of import to understand, at least at a general degree, precisely how the EU ETS is designed and operates. Due to its wide range and decentralized nature, the EU ETS is rather complicated, and the purpose here is to supply a really casual overview.
The EU ETS is the largest and most intricate policy tool of its sort in history ; and will cross at least 15 old ages. Although it has and will germinate over clip, it is basically comprised of 3 distinguishable stages. Phase I ran from 2005 until 2007, Phase II ( the current stage ) runs from 2008 until 2012, and Phase III will run from 2013 until 2020. Prior to each stage is an allotment period. This phase is perfectly cardinal because both the ‘capping ‘ and the ‘trading ‘ are wholly reliant on first make up one’s minding precisely who will be allocated emanation allowances, and at what degree these emanations will be capped. Unlike the centralized signifier of the ARP and the industry-specific Danish CO2 plan ; the EU ETS is monolithic, transnational and covers several different industries. This inherently called for a decentralized system. The chief participants in this system are the European Commission, the single province authoritiess, and at the base, the active houses. The initial duty of allotment falls to the national authoritiess. They are each needed to make and subject a National Allocation Plan ( NAP ) to the European Commission for blessing. Fair allotment at the installing degree of course requires the usage of CO2 emanations informations from each single installing. The authoritiess must hold on a national emanation cap, seek the blessing of the Commission, and so apportion emanation allowances across the participating houses. The houses involved operate energy and industrial installings with net heat surplus of 20 MW ( Wagner 2004, p.12 ) . These installings together are responsible for approximately 45 % of CO2 and 40 % of GHG emanations within the EU ( Betz & A ; Sato 2006, p.351 ) .
Upon the Commission ‘s blessing of all the NAPs, the Trading Period can get down. The member provinces allocate their entire allowances for the full period to their active houses. This is done to understate the possible negative impacts of terrible conditions events on one-year emanation degrees. These allowances are called EU Allowance Units ( EUAs ) and equal 1 metric metric ton of CO2. By the very nature of the trading market, the monetary value of an EUA is determined by the entire figure issued, and the exact monetary value is determined by the activity of the market itself – supply and demand. Ideally, a perfectly-sized ( capped ) market would ensue in a stable C monetary value and the intended decrease of emanations will happen due to a combination of abatement attempts and trading. If the market is oversupplied, monetary values will drop along with any inducement ( demand ) to try to cut down emanations by the participants ( Newbury 2009 ) . If the market is undersupplied, C monetary values will lift and although this may ab initio promote increased suspension attempts, the unexpected costs will deter farther engagement ( Hepburn 2006, p.239 ) .
Another facet of the EU ETS to observe is that banking and adoption is allowed within each trading stage. Emitters can borrow EUAs from future old ages or bank EUAs from past old ages. Borrowing from future stages is banned, and banking from Phase I into Phase II was ab initio to be at the discretion of the province ( Stauffer 2008 ) . Due to the result of Phase I, as will shortly be discussed, this did non stop up being the instance. At the terminal of each twelvemonth, participants report their entire emanations and manus over the tantamount figure of EUAs.
An apprehension of the construction and map of the EU ETS is necessary in order to grok the nature of some of the challenges and criticisms it faces. These issues vary in their nature and impact, but all must be confronted if the Scheme is to turn to its full potency.
Challenges & A ; Criticisms
When look intoing the unfavorable judgments of the Scheme it is sometimes a challenge to divide fact from fiction. Cases of both obstinate firm support and of overzealous resistance both cloud the existent image and keep back meaningful advancement. Many conservationists, along with the founding authoritiess of the EU ETS, hope that it will make much further than merely Europe. They hope it will animate a hereafter planetary reply to climate alteration ( Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2007, p.84 ) . If this prognostication has any opportunity of coming true ; it is of import that the challenges, errors and unfavorable judgments of the Scheme be raised and discussed openly ; that lessons are learned and applied from these errors.
Allotment is the foundation of any emanations trading strategy. This surely holds true for the EU ETS, and there is no statement that the allotment procedure for Phase I faced some serious jobs. The anchor of the full system is installation-level informations on CO2 emanations from each person take parting emitter. This, in hindsight, should non hold been a surprise to the member provinces. Apart from the lessons learned in the ARP, UK ETS, Danish CO2 strategy and BP ‘s plan ; several faculty members tried to raise a warning good prior to the initial NAP planning stage. One of the frankest warnings straight to the Commission was in 2002: “ Presently, no individual EU database presently provides plant-level information that could be used as a solid foundation for plant-level allotments across the Member States ” ( Harrison & A ; Radov 2002 ; cited by Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2007 ) . Without verifiable informations, the important truth of allotment is reduced to appraisals from 1000s of single emitters.
Draft NAPs were due for entry on March 31st 2004, giving the provinces less than six months to garner specific informations on 1000s of emitters after the Scheme was officially launched on October twenty-fifth 2003 ( Convery & A ; Ellerman 2008, p.9-10 ) . The member provinces perchance were sing a false sense of security due to their already established CO2 stock list informations, portion of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC ) . This information was useless in installation-level applications, as it could non be right factored down to each emitter. Interestingly, merely Denmark ‘s electrical industry emitters were immune to this challenge, as they were already describing this information as portion of their emanations merchandising plan ( Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2007, p.69 ) . The comparatively short clip available, complete deficiency of informations and immense figure of participants created a state of affairs where information had to be collected voluntarily and in many instances without any third-party confirmation. The Commission ended up cut downing 15 NAPs in Phase I by a sum of 290 million dozenss ( Convery & A ; Ellerman 2008, p.10 ) .
In malice of these allotment challenges, Phase I commenced merchandising on January 1st 2005. Carbon monetary values ( shown in this “ Price Graph ” -reference object ‘A ‘ ) increased rather steadily up to a‚¬30 per ton in April of 2006. It was at this extremum that participants started to gain that there was in fact a discernable glut of EUAs, and monetary values rapidly fell to individual figures by May based on the turning sentiment that there was a existent deficiency of scarceness. Monetary values continued to worsen to their lowest point of a‚¬0.10 per ton in September of 2007 ( Ellerman & A ; Joskow 2008 ) . Although Phase I was regarded as an experimental acquisition stage, this monetary value clang garnered plentifulness of imperativeness and provided ammo for the oppositions of the strategy. The European Commission does province that there was no existent CO2 suspension in Phase I. In fact, there was a 1.9 % addition in CO2 emanations from participants from 2005 to 2007 ( Europa 2008a ) . Allotment was closely studied for the 2005/2006 period and it was determined that the amount of under-allocations, or ‘short ‘ places was 10 % . ( refer to this graph “ Short and long places by member province ” -reference object ‘B ‘ ) The most important outlier in this information scope was the UK, with 28 % of installings under-allocated. Lithuania reigned supreme in footings of over-allocation at 45 % . The amount of the over-allocations, or ‘long ‘ places, was 13 % . This equates to a 3 % over-allocation of EUAs for Phase I ( Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2008, p.273 ) . These short and long places speak volumes on the truth of the NAPs from the member states. It might be said that the UK was overly-aggressive in puting their NAP, or that Lithuania was overly-passive in their NAP. Possibly the mistakes were from the abovementioned issues with installation-level informations aggregation ; with some emitters undervaluing their emanations and others greatly overrating theirs. What is clear from this state of affairs is that even a apparently little 3 % over-allocation of EUAs efficaciously crashed the market monetary value in this test period.
A unfavorable judgment often raised against the EU ETS is that it correlated straight with a spike in energy monetary values ( Mufson 2007 ) . It is expected that providers will go through increased costs on to clients, but it must be noted that these EUAs were freely allocated. It would look, harmonizing to critics, that providers tacked on the market value of these freely allocated allowances into the power supply command procedure, which had the consequence of increasing the monetary value of electricity in an about direct correlativity monetary values ( refer to this graph, “ Correlation between electricity monetary values and the monetary values of CO2 allowances under EU ETS ” -reference object ‘C ‘ ) with the lifting monetary value of C in the Phase I market ( Ellerman & A ; Joskow 2008, p.24-25 ) . Because increased monetary values were allegedly passed on to consumers with no existent addition in costs, critics accuse the energy sector of making ‘windfall net incomes ‘ ( WWF 2006 ; Sijm, Neuhoff, et Al. 2006 ) .
The chief grounds presented for windfall net incomes and the spike in energy monetary values is based on the leery associating between Phase I carbon monetary values and electricity. It does look rather possible to the layperson that the natural profit-seeking behavior of houses might account for this type of behavior. However, upon farther geographic expedition of this unfavorable judgment, there is in fact a strong instance that the ETS had small to no impact on electricity monetary values. Ellerman & A ; Joskow propose that fuel monetary values ( notably natural gas ) were much more clearly linked to electricity monetary values than the monetary value of EUAs ( refer to this graph, “ Monetary values for Electricity, Coal, Natural Gas and EUAs ” -reference object ‘D ‘ ) . They besides raise the point that in a competitory market, a generator must weigh the chance cost of utilizing an allowance to cover emanations versus selling that allowance ( Ellerman & A ; Joskow 2008, p.27 ) . Whether or non these houses can be trusted to act reasonably ; possibly the simplest solution to forestalling windfall net incomes is to extinguish the free allotment of EUAs.
Another challenge confronting the EU ETS is VAT fraud, where C credits are purchased in one state that does non bear down VAT on their purchase ( such as the UK ) and so exported for sale to a state that does ( Denmark, Belgium, etc. ) . The culprits so sell the credits, pocket the VAT, disappear and reiterate the procedure ; frequently utilizing the same credits. It is hard to turn up exact figures for the entire losingss in EU ETS-based VAT fraud ; but harmonizing to Europol, the sums merely in 2008 and 2009 are someplace around a‚¬5 billion. In some states, up to 90 % of trading volume was deceitful. In response ; France, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain and Germany wholly changed their revenue enhancement policies in 2009 to extinguish this fraud ( Europol 2009 ) .
The felons kept in front of the system, nevertheless, and rapidly moved the majority of their activity to Denmark. With a 25 % VAT rate, Denmark was rapidly robbed of about a‚¬5.5 billion in 2009 and 2010, or 2 % of their GDP. 88 % of registered EUA bargainers listed in the Danish system were forgeries and put up specifically for deceitful activity ( Barnes 2010 ) . In another dosage of embarrassment, a carefully orchestrated phishing cozenage occurred on January 28th 2010 and resulted in the loss of history unity at several trading companies. The entire loss has yet to be defined, but one German company lost 250,000 EUAs, worth more than a‚¬3 million in seconds ( Coelho 2010 ; Carbon Finance 2010 ) . This fraud straight costs the taxpayers one million millions, and embarrasses and undermines the full system. Significant action has been made to shut these loopholes, but the harm has already been done ; and efficaciously distracts from the existent benefits and future potency of the EU ETS.
Clearly, such a big and complex enterprise is non immune to challenges. Without doing errors, nevertheless, it is impossible to better and germinate into something better. There are many lessons to be learnt from these issues. Some alterations have already been implemented, but many are still being considered and necessitate farther treatment.
Traveling Forward & A ; In Decision
Taking a difficult expression at their inadvertences is of import if the Commission wants to truly do the EU ETS an effectual and animating system traveling frontward into the hereafter. As discussed above, there were, and are, several issues that need to be addressed if the Scheme is traveling to be genuinely successful and have any important influence on a hereafter planetary clime solution.
The European Commission has already applied several alterations based on the issues uncovered during Phase I of the EU ETS, and has proposed some major alterations to the design of Phases II & A ; III. One of the first issues associating to early allotments was the job of installation-level emanations informations. Efficaciously, these challenges were of course negated come ining Phase II, as informations on CO2 emanations at the installation-level were established and are now reported and recorded yearly by each state. This should efficaciously contradict any inquiry as to the unity of the informations and the associated linkages with the allotment of emanation licenses to the single emitters. The lesson to take away from this is for the provinces and their participants to be ready with the cardinal baseline informations, good before it is required for a critical component of the strategy. This should surely be enforced if the proposed inclusion of new industries ( including aluminium and ammonium hydroxide manufacturers ) and new gases ( azotic oxide and PFCs ) is to be locked in and finalised ( Europa 2008b ) .
During Phase I, the Commission did cut several of the NAPs but still ended up over-allocating by several per centum points. As discussed, this led to a clang in the monetary value of EUAs and the stage ended unluckily with an addition in overall emanations. Prior to Phase II, the Commission besides cut several NAPs ; but after Ecofys assessed the informations and concluded the caps were still excessively high ( Ecofys 2006 ) ; the Commission stepped in and cut an extra 7 % off the sums. This happened to fit up with a 7 % cut below 2005 emanation sums ( Europa 2006 ) . Data is still being analysed, but the revised Phase II cap should ideally ensue in a 2010 emanations decrease of 2.4 % ( IMF 2007 ) . The Commission has besides taken the bold measure of wholly passing the allotment procedure for Phase III. They are traveling to centralize the allotment and will be extinguishing the NAPs wholly ( Europa 2008b ) . This efficaciously takes the duty off from the provinces and eliminates the hazard of mistake or protectionist behavior.
The existent impact of the EU ETS on electricity monetary values has proven hard to turn out or accurately gauge. It would be about impossible to modulate such a specific linkage in so many companies across so many states. What can be controlled, in some instances, is the existent cost of the emanations licenses. To forestall windfall net incomes, the Commission should hold fishy industries pay for their licenses through auctioning. This is by no means a foreign construct to the EU ETS. Phase I allowed for up to 5 % of EUAs to be auctioned and Phase II raised this allowance to 10 % ( Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2007, p.73 ) . There is a instance to be made for auctioning. The first obvious benefit is that it forces a new degree of efficiency into the initial allotment of licenses. If a house has to pay hard currency for their licenses they will of course work much harder on suspension in order to reimburse that cost. The 2nd benefit of auctioning over free allotment is that it immediately eliminates the menace of windfall net incomes ( Helm 2010, p.194 ) . Auctioning may work more efficaciously than allotment across the full strategy. The exclusion being industries that face direct competition from outside the boundaries of the EU ETS ( Carbon Trust 2009 ) , as increased costs will cut down their fight.
On the challenges of fraud and condemnable activity, tough lessons have been learned. This type of offense was inherently hard to foretell ; as policymakers tend non to believe like felons. They are more focussed on making a system that works efficaciously and is accessible to the most participants. It is dubious that even the most cautious Godheads could hold imagined fraud making the 10s of one million millions of euros. Most of the loopholes and weak musca volitanss have been corrected, but it is ever critical that an exceeding degree of watchfulness be maintained at all times. This is particularly the instance for when spread outing across new states and industries. Every lesson must be carried frontward, as bar and readying should supplant reaction.
In decision ; through a ambitious way that Nietzsche would hold good admired, the EU ETS is emerging as a truly feasible and exciting setup for change by reversaling planetary clime alteration. Much like the German philosopher ‘s proud tree ; without storms, bad luck, opposition, obstinacy, misgiving and greed ; it could non hold grown to its proud tallness ( Nietzsche 1882 ) . There is still a long way in front, with more challenges great and little to suppress ; but if every experience is applied and non bury, its subdivisions may good turn further than imagined. The Commission is already hammering in front with several major corrections and enlargements, and it would look that they have no purpose of decelerating down. The EU ETS genuinely is a expansive experiment ; an of import column of European clime policy and possibly, given clip, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme may well “ turn out to be the basis of an eventual planetary clime government ” ( Ellerman & A ; Buchner 2007, p.84 ) .
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