This paper is focussed on a reform of the legal order, and in peculiar – reform of the judiciary – as an EU pre-accession status. I would wish to research to which extent the experience of ‘new ‘ EU member provinces, in peculiar those of the CEE, in reforming their tribunal system, should be used to suggest possible solutions for new entrants. Using the illustration of Ukraine, Poland, and Czech Republic, I would wish to place similarities in attitudes of Judgess and tribunal staff towards readying for the accession in Ukraine and in the ‘new ‘ EU member provinces. Ukraine, like many other CEE states, has to turn to the issue of Judgess educated and professionally formed under the Communist government, confronting the demands of extended acquis. Apart from these specific facets of the EU expansion conditionality, I would wish to touch upon broader issues when inquiring about the bounds to the EU expansion every bit good as what are the common criterions for effectual bench in Europe.


After the autumn of Iron Curtain in 1989, enormous alterations affected the country what now comprises the eastern boundary lines of the EU [ 2 ] . These several moving ridges of consecutive expansions [ 3 ] made European states ( both EU and non-EU ) more geographically consistent, while reforms advocated by ( pre ) accession programmes, association understandings and assorted other instruments, assisted former Eastern Bloc states to go politically and economically closer to the EU: some European states joined the EU and others, like Ukraine, became closer to the EU, for assorted political and economic grounds, both internal every bit good as external to the EU itself.

Expansion: who decides?

Harmonizing to Art. 6 ( 1 ) and Art.49 of the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the operation of the European Union ( ex-Art. O, ex-Art 49 of the TEU ) [ 4 ] , any European state that adheres to the rules of the EU, may use to fall in. These rules, which evolved throughout ‘several consecutive moving ridges of EU expansion over the past two decennaries ‘ ( Petrovic ( 2004 ) ) [ 5 ] , organize a certain set of established standards ( economic, political, geographic and legislative ) , that define if a state is eligible to entree to the EU [ 6 ] .

These Copenhagen standards, among others, require that ‘candidate state has achieved stableness of establishments vouching democracy ‘ and ‘the regulation of jurisprudence ‘ [ 7 ] . Most of these standards have been elucidated by the development of the organic structure of the acquis [ 8 ] , T every bit good as by the ECJ instance jurisprudence ( although neither ECJ nor ( as we will set up subsequently ) ECHR ‘s instance jurisprudence trades with the accession standards straight as such ) . Even though, different member provinces have opted for alleged ‘transition periods ‘ which evoke sometimes somewhat different, if non conflicting readings of the acquis, which will be discussed below in item [ 9 ] .

Features of the future expansion policy after Lisbon Treaty

Having said that, what are the characteristics of the future expansion policy of the EU and what challenges the EU will confront after Lisbon Treaty in topographic point? Will the EU halt its eastward/southward expansion wholly or it is merely a impermanent hold-up? And if so, would it be still important/visible for a state without clear positions of EU rank, still to follow – voluntarily, head you – the principal of acquis?

There are several proposals presently ( as of December 2009 ) being implemented or suggested for execution: the Commission ‘s ain European Vicinity Policy ( ENP ) , the Northern Dimension, the Barcelona Process or the new Eastern Partnership suggested by Poland and Sweden, to call a few. These proposals represent a new attitude in the EU ‘s dealingss with its eastern and southern neighbors. The EU presently has Partnership and Cooperation Agreements ( PCAs ) in force with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine [ 10 ] ( a PCA has been signed but non yet ratified with Belarus [ 11 ] ) , and Association Agreements ( AAs ) with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia ( an AA has been agreed but non yet signed with Syria ) [ 12 ] . These programmes proclaim – at least theoretically – rather a considerable betterment of the degree of political battle, including prospective association understandings. This is particularly of import after the Lisbon Treaty has put a new legal footing for the vicinity understandings, developing a ‘special relationship with neighbouring states… founded on the values of the Union ‘ and therefore reasoning ‘specific understandings with the states concerned ‘ which ‘may incorporate mutual rights and duties every bit good as the possibility of set abouting activities jointly ‘ [ 13 ] .

The EU besides advocates an intensive aid for these states ‘ reforms to turn to such common challenges as the recent internal and international tensenesss, which have become frozen struggles, illegal human trafficking, illegal migration, structural geographical restraints and deficient societal and economic substructure. The new ENP suggests steps to back up the societal and economic development of these states, and several other enterprises that will give an grounds of the EU ‘s support. Among the chief points of the a new cooperation model there are administrative capacity betterment programmes ; and committednesss on regulative estimate to the acquis.

Stabilisation and Association Process: export of EU jurisprudence?

As stated above, the EU typically marks Association Agreements ( AAs ) with those states who wish to fall in the EU and would perpetrate themselves to reforms in the countries of political relations, economic system, trade policy, and human rights issues. As a wages, the state may be offered a carrot of fiscal or proficient aid ( which, as a affair of fact, is normally paid back to EU experts coming to that peculiar state to take alleged ‘twinning procedure ‘ , i.e. coupling of a peculiar EU or MS establishment with a corresponding establishment of that peculiar state ) and ‘free ‘ entree to some or all EU markets, financess, establishments, and programmes. The AAs which were most late signed besides included a Free Trade Agreement proviso between the EU and those states.

Most late, these understandings were signed as portion of the Stabilisation and Association Process ( SAp ) and European Vicinity Policy ( ENP ) EU policies and instruments. The Western Balkans states are covered by SAp and the EU marks with them “ Stabilisation and Association Agreements ” ( SAA ) which should explicitly include promise for future EU rank. SAAs in rule are similar to the Europe Agreements which were signed with the Central and Eastern European states in the 1990s and to the Association Agreement with Turkey. The ENP is addressed towards developing states, who seek to go either members of the EU, or more closely integrated with the EU economic system. Both the SAA and ENP are modeled upon the EU ‘s acquis and all understandings with current campaigner and possible campaigner states contain estimate of Torahs clauses. However the alliance of statute law with that of the Community, is ‘softer ‘ than for full EU members and some policy subjects are non covered by a peculiar SAA ( depending on the certain province ) .

All understandings with current campaigner and possible campaigner states contain estimate of Torahs clauses. As portion of this procedure, Copenhagen standards imply that a campaigner state has to include acquis into its ain legal system. In all countries of the acquis, a candidate state must convey its establishments, direction capacity and administrative and judicial systems up to EU criterions, but in my sentiment foremost and foremost it has to hold its jurisprudence book in order.

Expansion, Rule of jurisprudence and Legal Integration

So, does it intend that by accessing to the EU, the fledglings are automatically cleared from their old wonts? Lets us see an ideal universe where the acquis plays a enormous function in European Political Integration, i.e. ‘political integrating by law ‘ ( as AW Green put it in 1969 ) , and where the EU expansion is about neither the figure of states which wish to fall in the EU nor it is about the day of the month of future accession for each state, but instead about the grade of alliance with the acquis as the acquis is the anchor of the EU [ 14 ] .

An statement widely researched by Lazowski is that to go a member and to hold a grade of legal integrating are two different things [ 15 ] . In his paper he advocates the creative activity of alleged EU legal infinite and argues that so there are exist rather a few new integrating theoretical accounts in dealingss with some of the EU ‘s neighbors. He calls it ‘enhanced multiculturalism and bilaterality as theoretical accounts of integrating without rank ‘ and presupposes that these theoretical accounts ( like EEA or EU-Switzerland ) may function as ‘either a tool or a design ‘ , at the same clip holding uncertainties upon their utility in dealingss with ENP states as being excessively hazardous withregard to the effectivity of the EU jurisprudence. Lazowski farther argues that such ‘europeanization ‘ may take assorted signifiers and it depends on figure of factors, sometimes multidimensional 1s. He argues that there are rather a figure of international pacts between the EC/EU and neighboring states which impose on these states the duty to use selected pieces of acquis. He farther argues that this leads to ‘legal integrating without rank ‘ , and stipulates that there are presently two theoretical accounts or classs of partial legal integrating – inactive one ( Energy Community and EC/EU-Swiss Framework ) and dynamic one ( EEA ) . The major statement that Lazowski makes is that these theoretical accounts may function as a design for planing a future regulative model of cooperation with ENP states.

Recent unfavorable judgment of instead excessively speedy accession of Romania and Bulgaria which – as it is going all the way now – were excessively ‘immature ‘ for fall ining the EU, shows that to give fulfilment of economic and legal standards for the interest of inventive political ‘benefits ‘ was excessively much of an attempt and at the terminal of the twenty-four hours had really an inauspicious consequence on the whole of the EU expansion, both as a procedure and as an thought [ 16 ] . As it will be shown by Bobek in a paper which I will mention subsequently, non merely those two states, nevertheless, are haunted by skeletons in their closet.

However, we – once more – go forth aside political and other issues which clouded these states ‘ accession, as it is beyond the range of this paper. I would besides warn the reader from re-considering the term ‘European ‘ , as assorted definitions of Europe exist – Blockman and Lazowski, for illustration, set eastbound boundary lines of the EU every bit far as the Don river [ 17 ] ; nevertheless every bit far as the rank in the EU is concerned, whether a state is European is “ capable to political appraisal ” [ 18 ] by the Commission and more importantly-the Council.

Judiciary as a chapter of the acquis?

Historically during each moving ridge of expansion, the acquis was divided into several chapters, each dedicated to different policy countries. Therefore, for illustration, the 5th EU expansion papers, particularly the 1 that admitted Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, consisted of 31 chapters, and for the 6th enlargement – of Croatia and Turkey – the acquis is split into 35 chapters [ 19 ] , taking at better reconciliation between them and spliting the most hard 1s into separate sub-chapters for doing dialogues easier, and besides unifying some of the easier chapters, traveling some policies between chapters, every bit good as renaming quite a few of them [ 20 ] . One of the most singular accomplishments is that former Chapter 24 ‘Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs ‘ of the fifth Expansion is being split into two Chapters – ‘23. Judiciary and cardinal rights ‘ and ‘24. Justice, freedom and security ‘ in the 6th Enlargement. In my sentiment this emphasising is really important.

Judicial answerability, judicial capacity and judicial independency

So, what should be done by an aspirant state in order to fall in the EU? Among the four groups of EU rank standards – political, geographic, economic, legislative – I will concentrate on the legislative standards as the 1s relevant to this range of work, severally to the regulation of jurisprudence and legislative alliance.

Judicial independency and judicial capacity are cardinal facets of the political standard, and peculiarly the demand that the accessing state ensures institutional stableness and warrants, inter alia, the attachment to the regulation of jurisprudence and protection of human rights [ 21 ] . EU considers of an extreme importance the ability of benchs to protect citizens ‘ rights, and capacity and ability to implement the acquis [ 22 ] .

The attachment to the regulation of jurisprudence agencies that any authorities authorization should merely be exercised in conformity with a set of Torahs which are clearly documented and adopted through an established legislative process. Hayek ( 1960 ) [ 23 ] provinces, that the regulation of jurisprudence agencies that any authorities authorization must ne’er keep an single except in the fortunes of implementing a certain jurisprudence.

One of the most celebrated accounts of the construct of regulation of jurisprudence was expressed by Venn Dicey in 1895, when he described three-party significance of the regulation of jurisprudence: cipher is punishable except for a breach of jurisprudence before the tribunal ; every authorities functionary is under the same duty as any ordinary citizen ; and any authorities functionary is personally responsible for a error [ 24 ] .

and Ott [ 25 ] .

Although legislative alliance is technically direct outside the Copenhagen standards ( whereby rank presupposes the campaigner ‘s ability to take on the duties of rank including attachment to the purposes of political, economic and pecuniary brotherhood ) it is widely seen and requested as an extra demand that all prospective members must ordain statute law in order to convey their Torahs in line with the acquis. In this regard Roos argues that

The important inquiry is what the “rule of law” as referred to by the EU in the Copenhagen Criteria and by the Constitutions of the states of South East Europe really means. What demands does a province demand to carry through, both de jure and de facto, in order to be truly called a province based on the “rule of law” [ 26 ]

and she farther describes the construct of the “rule of law” from a Continental, in peculiar German, legal point of position, every bit good as the basic elements and requirements of a province based on the “rule of law” . This will be, as Bobek will explicate in a subsequently cited work, of some importance to the subject of my paper as most of the fifth and 6th expansion states – at least gepgraphically if non philosophically, in the significance of the doctrine of jurisprudence – belong to either strictly Romano-Germanic ( or, to be more specifically, Germanic with Austrian influence ) , or – in the instance of Ukraine – boundary line Romano-Germanic, as Wood [ 27 ] names them.

In accessing/candidate states, the undermentioned facets have to be reviewed, viz. bing and developing legal criterions of each accessing/candidate state, institutional agreements within the judiciary itself and policies and patterns guaranting the independency and nonpartisanship of the judicial procedure. A really good analysis of preparation of Judgess, for illustration, is to be found in Sabato [ 28 ] . The EUMAP besides stresses that

… the cardinal aim, nevertheless, is to analyze the grade to which the quality of Judgess and back uping institutional substructure warrants competent and efficient adjudication [ 29 ] .

Some elements of judicial answerability should be assessed as a necessary tool to heighten judicial capacity at both the institutional and personal degree. As Emmert puts it,

… the pre-accession programmes of the European Union and the campaigner states have focused to a great extent on jurisprudence reform. Merely comparatively late, it was recognised that successful administrative and tribunal reform would be merely as necessary in order to accomplish the coveted ends, viz. that the campaigners would finally be able to take on their duties as new members of the Union. Unfortunately, it has now become apparent that it is easier to compose new Torahs than to acquire them decently applied in every twenty-four hours pattern… decision makers and Judgess in Central and Eastern Europe have important troubles with Western working methods, specifically the application of international norms in the national legal order, due procedure and procedural precautions, intervention of case in points, declaration of ambiguities and blank in the jurisprudence, etc. , which may in bend consequence in unfair and sometimes absurd application of Torahs. These troubles can non be resolved simply by organizing of all time more training classs and other theoretical programmes… the bulk of attempts advancing administrative and tribunal reform applied so far have rendered merely meagre consequences. Therefore, extra and more originative steps have to be designed and implemented and have to be continued for old ages beyond accession of most of these states to the EU in 2004. Otherwise, regulation of jurisprudence meriting its name will non happen in the new Member States [ 30 ] .

Bobek [ 31 ] warns from an abstract argument on judicial independency, alternatively suggesting to concentrate on three nucleus issues withregard the single independency of Judgess: single independency per se ( decision-making independency – e.g. no ‘phone-justice ‘ ; administrative independency – e.g. constitution of a self-administrative organic structure of the bench ; and mental independency – e.g.critical thought of Judgess towards legislative assembly ) ; answerability ( disciplinary, ethical and the similar ) , and foreclosure ( i.e. choice of Judgess – hierarchal V co-ordinate ) . I will come to this interesting argument later in my treatment about Ukraine.

Traveling into more item, Mohr and Contini [ 32 ] province that judicial answerability may be achieved by presenting crystalline mechanisms for choice of Judgess and for appraisal of their public presentation, and by guaranting transparence of internal operations in conformity with pre-established regulations, by formal accountability for outgos, and by transparence of judicial procedure.

So understood, judicial answerability implies transparence and accountability instead than duty or liability. The EUMAP besides stresses that [ 33 ]

… such subjects as condemnable and civil liability and professional subject of Judgess, every bit good as related issues of corruptness, judicial moralss, and struggle of involvement, should be besides reviewed.

An first-class illustration of analysis in this country is in Piana, where she argues that

… in the post-communist states ‘ campaigner to the European rank, the EU and the Council of Europe exercised a heavy force per unit area on domestic elite to advance the acceptance of institutional warrants of judicial independency and judicial capacity. Trusting on a broad set of interviews with the cardinal histrions of the European and domestic establishments, [ I ] will discourse the logic of action of the judicial reforms adopted in Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary in two policy subfields: the administration of the judicial subdivision and the administration of the tribunal. The empirical grounds confirms that the procedures of reform have been profoundly influenced by the national histrions who had been empowered during the democratic passage. They have been able to to the full work the resources provided by the EU [ 34 ] .

One of the cardinal statements of my research is that the personal features and professional quality of Judgess are critical to a capable bench. Judges should possess unity, sound opinion, professional eruditeness, and accomplishment to render opinions in conformity with jurisprudence, and with their ain scruples. The EUMAP besides stresses that

… to guarantee this, Judgess ‘ choice should be done in conformity with clear regulations and processs that verify their personal and professional suitableness for the profession. They should be publically accountable for their public presentation during their calling, and they should be given the chance and, possibly, the duty to continuously refresh and better their professional cognition and accomplishments [ 35 ] .

Another statement is that more competent and efficient bench is non plenty. There should be adequate resources available to judiciary to transport out their work decently, every bit good as their organisational chart must be drafted state-of-the-artly. Modern engineering should be imposed in tribunals, and administrative patterns should be crystalline, every bit good as the managerial capacity of the judicial subdivision should be enhanced, and Judgess and judicial decision makers should be held accountable for their public presentation.

There is quite an extended figure of bookmans who have established their position on the topic. Thus, Lazowski in one of his earlier works analyses the Polish experience of version of the Polish legal system to European Union jurisprudence [ 36 ] . He notes that in Poland in peculiar, judicial reforms have been influenced to a larger extent by developments in Polish foreign policy, as a consequence of Polish engagement in a figure of international organisations like Council of Europe ( whether this might be a general modus operandi is dubious, particularly for Ukraine, which has been a member of the Council of Europe for rather a clip, however it has small consequence on Ukraine ‘s domestic tribunal system, neither on the figure of instances against Ukraine in the ECHR, where it ranks 7th in the figure of instances put before the ECHR against it [ 37 ] ) . I assume this is for the first clip when Lazovski makes a suggestion that voluntary harmonisation may happen when a state which is non ( yet ) a member of the EU or is non an accession state, opts for accommodating its national legal system to acuis. Ramsey makes a general overview of Polish execution of Agenda 2000 [ 38 ] . Adamson and Emmert, on the other manus, analyze the organisation of the legal system and the several functions of the Ministry of Justice, the Bar Association, the attorneies, and the tribunals while doing such a reform in Estonia [ 39 ] . Mikelenas has an first-class piece of work dedicated to the evolvement of civil process as a legal signifier of judicial legislation in Lithuania [ 40 ] . Schultz makes rather a general premise of Administrative Law and Performance Reform of Government Agencies in Communist and Post-Communist States based upon experience of Armenia [ 41 ] , where he makes a first measure towards an scrutiny of the efficaciousness of administrative jurisprudence reform in Communist and former Communist provinces ; this effort is continued by Hayrapetyan [ 42 ] and to some extent by Bravo [ 43 ] .

EU common criterions for the bench

Complying with common criterions for effectual bench: differences, convergences and links between the Council of Europe ‘ and EU acquis

When seeking for an EU common criterion for effectual bench, one may come to a paradox which is that the EU requires from campaigners conformity with mistily defined ‘rule of jurisprudence ‘ criterions when itself it has no competency ( art. 2-6 TFEU ) to cover with those affairs. That ‘s why it keeps on borrowing legal criterions from the Council of Europe ( CoE ) .

There are really two countries where the CoE criterions are adopted as a footing of the EU acquis: the cardinal rights ( through the European Convention on Human Rights as an instrument and European Court of Human Rights ( ECHR ) as and implementing establishment ; although since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has the force of jurisprudence effectual from 1 December 2009, and it is yet non clear how the two will coexist ) and the efficiency of justness ( including the disposal and quality of justness ; through the CEPEJ – the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice ) . We will analyse below why this is the instance, merely traveling briefly through the cardinal rights and concentrating more on efficiency of justness.

The functions of the ECHR and the ECJ are frequently confused. The relationship between the ECJ and ECHR as a legal system is besides cumbrous. Lebeck ( 2007 ) states that, there has been no clear elucidation sing relationship between the ECJ and the ECHR [ 44 ] . In existent fact, these two tribunals are rather different in footings of their instance typology and legal power.

On one manus, all EU member-states are besides parties ( via their rank in the Council of Europe ) to the European Convention on Human Rights and are accepting the legal power of the ECHR ; and the ECHR case-law is regarded as a portion of the common constitutional tradition of member-states and has ‘special significance ‘ ( Starmer ( 2004 ) ) [ 45 ] which, as Lebeck ( 2007 ) points out, has eventually resulted in acceptance of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU ; most of the CoE conventions are regarded by ECJ as portion of the acquis in order to guarantee a unvarying application of legal criterions between the acquis and the relevant CoE criterions, in peculiar, in a position that the acquis should be consistent with such basic paperss as the European Convention on Human Rights ; Jacobs ( 2006 ) confirms that the European Convention on Human Rights is being treated by the ECJ as if it had legal force in the EU, and including using the ECHR case-law [ 46 ] . Cardinal rights in acquis have been normally applied to Commission determinations, Regulations and Directives, every bit good as subjugated national steps designed to implement the acquis. Outside this field of application, nevertheless, cardinal rights in acquis have no binding consequence [ 47 ] .

On the other manus, the acquis itself is non bound by the ECHR determinations [ 48 ] , and the CoE plays no institutional function in determining the EU acquis [ 49 ] . Lebeck ( 2007 ) points out that the ECJ ever rejected the thought to handle ECHR as a portion of acquis or to be bound by any of ECHR ‘s determinations [ 50 ] .

The relation between the ECHR and EC-law has been mentioned in a figure of instances from the ECJ [ 51 ] which has been explored by a figure of bookmans [ 52 ] . Harmonizing to Jacobs [ 53 ] , the ECJ now cites about routinely the case-law of the ECHR ; and re-considered its ain old case-law in the visible radiation of ECHR case-law ; and vice-versa. The consequence of Bosphorus v. Ireland is really of import as cardinal rights which are treated as an built-in portion of EU jurisprudence can be used to dispute the cogency of the acquis or the actions of the EU establishments ( see e.g. Lock [ 54 ] and Douglas-Scott [ 55 ] ) .

This cooperation, nevertheless, has a deficiency of reciprocality, e.g. CoE representatives are non allow to either participate in COREPER meetings ( even as perceivers ) or to go to the working groups of the EU Council but non frailty versa [ 56 ] . However, the CoE had been consulted on ad hoc footing by the Commission through the engagement of NGO ‘s working with the CoE in the field of human rights, e.g. on struggles of legal power in condemnable proceedings, given of artlessness, and certain procedural rights in condemnable proceedings [ 57 ] .

This type of legal cooperation has become more proactive after the extension of ECJ competences to several countries antecedently reserved entirely to Member States of the CoE ( such as justness and place personal businesss ) . Among the paperss which led to this it is deserving adverting the 1987 Arrangement between the CoE and the EC and the 2001 Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership, every bit good as the MoU between the CoE and the EU signed in 2007. The latter papers is fundamentally related to scene of common legal criterions and legal cooperation between the ECJ and ECHR in such countries as the regulation of jurisprudence, and cardinal freedoms.

tbc about efficiency of justness

  1. These theses form portion of my PhD research proposal at the School of Law, University of Westminster, UK.
  2. Actually, when the wall came down at that place was no EU but three European Communities – European union, ECSC and EAEC. A must-do reading is Monnet, Jean. 1959 [ 1994 ] . Prospect for a New Europe. In: The Origins and Development of European Integration. A Reader and Commentary, edited by P. Stirk and D. Weigall. London and New York: Pinter.
  3. The 5th expansion of the EU in 2004 was the largest 1 since the constitution of the EU in footings of population and district but non in footings of GDP ( wealth ) . It included Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Part of the same 5th expansion was the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 ( largely for political grounds ) , who – for assorted grounds – were unable to fall in in 2004 but constitute portion of the 5th expansion. A rather comprehensive analysis of the 5th expansion could be found in: Assya Kavrakova. The Unfinished Business of the Fifth Enlargement Countries. Comparative Report. A© 2009 Open Society Institute – Sofia, ISBN 978-954-9828-69-6. Withregard the 6th and subsequent expansions, at nowadays ( December 2009 ) , there are three evidently recognized campaigners: Croatia ( applied 2003 ) , Macedonia ( applied 2004 ) and Turkey ( applied 1987 ) , albeit the latter ‘ entree to the EU has been halted by some MS for assorted grounds ; nevertheless Macedonia has non yet officially ( as of December 2009 ) started dialogues to fall in. The other states in the Western Balkans have already signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreements ( SAA ) that have entered into force for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, and which by and large precede the housing of formal application for rank. Montenegro ( applied December 2008 ) and Albania ( applied April 2009 ) are besides seeking for rank, but the European Commission has non given its consent yet. For more comprehensive analysis of recent expansions see: Handbook on European expansion: a commentary on the enlargement procedure. Ott A, Inglis K ( Eds. ) , 2002, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague.
  4. “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the operation of the European Union” , as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. hypertext transfer protocol: //www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx? id=1296 & A ; lang=en

  5. Petrovic, B. M. , 2004-03-17 “ European Union Adaptive Pressures and Political Party Systems of ( Potential ) Candidate States: The Cases of Croatia and Serbia ” Paper presented at the one-year meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online & lt ; .pdf & gt ; . 2009-05-26 from hypertext transfer protocol: //www.allacademic.com/meta/p72222_index.html
  6. These regulations were set at the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, therefore the name
  7. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 1993, 7.A.iii hypertext transfer protocol: //www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf
  8. It should be deserving observing that European Council does non hold the competency to follow legislative Acts of the Apostless ( under the new model ) . Prior to Lisbon Treaty it had had no competency to follow anything adhering at all. Presidency Conclusions were merely political paperss.
  9. See e.g. Goldner Lang, I. Transitional Agreements In The Hypertrophied European Union: How Free Is The Free Movement Of Workers? Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2008. hrcak.srce.hr/file/44780, and European Commission. Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG. Social Protection and Social Integration. Free Movement of Workers and Co-Ordination of Social Security Schemes. The Transitional Agreements for the Free Movement of Workers from the New Member States Following Expansion of the European Union on 1 May 2004. ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet? docId=144 & A ; langId=en
  10. To be replaced in 2010, when AA is to be signed with Ukraine.
  11. Any advancement in EU-Belarus dealingss stopped in 1996 after serious maltreatments in the development of the regulation of jurisprudence and democracy in Belarus, for the ground that EU did non acknowledge the 1996 fundamental law. Neither the PCA nor its trade-related elements were implemented, and Belarus was non invited to fall in the ENP at that phase. As a effect, Belarusian rank in the Council of Europe was turned down, bilateral dealingss at the ministerial degree were suspended, and EU TACIS plans were put on clasp. In 1998, dealingss were once more worsened when President Lukashenka deported several western embassadors. In 2004, the Council of Europe adopted a study naming on Belarusian governments to disregard several functionaries after carry oning a thorough probe of the instances of outstanding Belarusian politicians who have disappeared. The EU spoke strongly against the result of the 2006 election, observing that extra limitations were to be imposed against those responsible for maltreatments. As a resul of that, the EU has besides imposed travel limitations and fiscal countenances against those responsible for maltreatments. The EU besides launched a undertaking to back up entree to independent information in Belarus. In June 2007, the EU further announced the backdown of GSP trade penchants for Belarus, following an appraisal by the ILO that Belarus had non ensured the protection of freedom of association. After the September 2008 parliamentary elections, the EU issued a statement once more showing its concern about the behavior of the elections, which did non match to the democratic criterions. In October 2008, the EU suspended its visa countenances for six months on legion Belarusian functionaries, including President Lukashenka, in response to Belarus ‘ release of political captives in August ; this suspension has been extended until December 2009. In May 2009, the EU eventually invited Belarus to take portion in the Eastern Partnership Initiative. Beginning: U.S. State Department.Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office. Background Note: Belarus. July 2009, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. hypertext transfer protocol: //www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5371.htm
  12. They are usualy referred to as ‘Euro-med Agreements ‘
  13. Amalgamate versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the operation of the European Union ( OJC115, 9.5.2008 )
  14. One observation should be made at the really get downing. When we discuss EU accession, we leave aside recent unwise remarks made by some failed political figures approximately EU as a Christian nine.
  15. Adam Lazowski. Enhanced multilateralism and enhanced bilaterality: Integration without rank in the European Union. CMLR, p.1433 Volume 45, NA°5, 2008
  16. Taking the instance of Ukraine, possibly the rank carrot is non strong plenty, and statements that worked with comparatively stable states may non needfully work with provinces enduring from cardinal jobs of statehood, like Ukraine which had had 13 Prime Ministers ( 18 numbering moving PMs ) since Ukrainian independency from the Soviet Union in 1991
  17. See inter alia The European Union and its Neighbours. A Legal Appraisal of the EU ‘s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration. Steven Blockmans, Adam Lazowski ( Eds. ) , pp. 3-10, 2006, T. M. C. Asser Institute, The Hague.
  18. “ Legal inquiries of expansion ” . Expansion of the European Union. The European Parliament. 1998-05-19. hypertext transfer protocol: //www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm. Retrieved 2008-07-09.
  19. hypertext transfer protocol: //www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Acquis
  20. Understanding Enlargement. The European Union ‘s expansion policy, p.10. ISBN 978-92-79-06636-8, European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, 2007
  21. Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity ( 2002 ) , and Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence ( 2001 )
  22. European Parliament declaration on the comprehensive monitoring study of the European Commission on the province of readiness for EU rank of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia ( COM ( 2003 ) 675 – C5-0532/2003 – 2003/2201 ( INI ) ) .
  23. Hayek, F von. The Fundamental law of Liberty, Ch 14- The Precautions of Individual Liberty. University of Chicago Press, 1960
  24. Venn Dicey. A. Law of the Constitution ( London: MacMillan, 9th ed. , 1950 ) , 194.
  25. Ott, Katarina. Croatian Accession to the European Union: Institutional Challenges. In: “Monitoring the Procedure of Croatia ‘s Accession to the EU “ , December 2003, Institute of Public Finance. Zagreb. hypertext transfer protocol: //www.ijf.hr/eng/EU2/Ott.pdf
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