The Value Added Tax ( VAT ) as presently stated in the Dutch jurisprudence was introduced on January 1st 1969 by the authorities. The VAT is a revenue enhancement levied on the value added of goods and services. Neutrality in the economic system is thereby an of import purpose. Neutrality implies the bar of any break of competition in the economic system. In order to make harmonisation in the European Union refering the VAT, there is a VAT directive.[ 2 ]This directive is meant to give instructions to the Member provinces of the European Union about the construction of the VAT and the execution of the different commissariats in their national statute laws. The VAT directive indicates that a Member province demands to use a normal revenue enhancement rate of minimal 15 % for the revenue enhancement of goods and services. Besides, each member province has the option to use one or two decreased revenue enhancement rates on certain goods and services. This decreased revenue enhancement rate demands to be at least 5 % .[ 3 ]The Dutch authorities has chosen for a ingestion revenue enhancement mix. Normal goods and services are taxed at 19 % . Necessities ( nutrients and certain medical merchandises ) and goods for which the authorities wants to excite ingestion ( e.g. humanistic disciplines and civilization ) are taxed at a decreased rate of 6 % . Exempted goods ( e.g. child care and medical sector ) are being taxed at 0 % .
1.2 Relevance
A recent treatment in the Dutch policy sphere concerns altering the ingestion revenue enhancement mix to one uniform rate.[ 4 ]With a unvarying rate all purchases of goods and services will be taxed at the same rate. This implies that the 6 % VAT rate will be wholly abolished and the current 19 % VAT rate will be reduced. The base is that the passage to one unvarying VAT rate should be budget impersonal. The CPB[ 5 ]conducted a survey on behalf of the revenue enhancement survey commission with respects to a possible VAT rate that would be budget impersonal. The result of this survey shows that budget neutrality would be achieved at a VAT rate of 15,26 % .
The treatment sing one unvarying VAT rate has already been a point of treatment in 1985-1986[ 6 ]and 2001[ 7 ]. The State Secretary of Financial Affairs[ 8 ]references a few practical statements in favour of a unvarying VAT rate. A unvarying VAT rate ensures complete neutrality between goods and services ; there is no domestic deformation as a consequence of differentiated VAT rates. Another statement is that there are no more treatments between companies and revenue enhancement governments on the duty categorization and hence the demand for supervising disappears. Subsequently the barrier to merchandise invention disappears if bing related or substitute goods are covered by the decreased VAT rate. By using a unvarying VAT rate merchandise invention is no longer obstructed.[ 9 ]Finally there are no more administrative and execution costs originating from the differentiated VAT system. In comparing with a unvarying VAT duty the difference is about a‚¬ 100 million.[ 10 ]
One of the chief statements against the debut of a unvarying VAT rate is the ‘perceived rising prices ‘ . The addition in the decreased VAT rate ( plus A± 10 % ) rate is more seeable than the lessening in the regular VAT rate ( minus A± 3 % ) , particularly if we take into history that goods that are covered under the decreased VAT rate are bought comparatively more frequently. Another point that the Studiecommissie Belastingstelsel points out is transverse boundary line shopping. For merchandises that are covered by the decreased VAT rate there will be a large difference in duty with Belgium ( 6 % ) and Germany ( 7 % ) . On the other manus we see that the duty for normal goods will be lower in The Netherlands in comparing with Belgium ( 21 % ) and Germany ( 19 % ) . These differences in duties could take to traverse boundary line shopping. Cnossen[ 11 ]shows in his essay that he is in favour of one unvarying VAT rate without freedoms. He claims that the freedoms and the differentiated VAT rates lead to economic deformations, revenue enhancement arbitrage and administrative costs. Crawford, Keen and Smith shows that recent international surveies points out that many of these freedoms are unneeded and demonstrates the potency for a reform of the VAT system. Another structural issue is that VAT zero-rating of exported goods and services between EU member provinces needs reconsideration, exploited by the ‘carousel fraud ‘[ 12 ]and other usual equivocation. This leads to the undermentioned research inquiry that will be investigated in this paper:
“ Is a unvarying VAT rate desirable from a welfare-economic point of position? ”
1.3 Methodology
We simulate the CONSTAX-model for The Netherlands, by usage of an excel spreadsheet, to happen authorities instruments and other results in the optimum at which public assistance is maximized and compare it to a state of affairs that most closely represents the current differentiated VAT system. The analysis of societal public assistance is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. The aim is to supply a numerical illustration of the theoretical account, which should be every bit representative as possible for The Netherlands, such that you can make policy experiments with the simulation. This might give an indicant what would go on in the existent universe if the authorities decides to alter the revenue enhancement construction to a unvarying VAT rate.
The research inquiry will be answered by analysing two instances. Each of these instances contains a comparing of societal public assistance between taxing ingestion goods at differentiated VAT rates ( the current revenue enhancement system in The Netherlands ) with regard to taxing goods at a unvarying VAT rate. The first instance concerns the analysis of efficiency statements entirely in a society where we have homogenous agents. Equity statements will be ignored in this specific instance, because in a homogenous society there is no demand to redistribute. By entirely concentrating on efficiency we can happen the extra load of a alteration in the ingestion revenue enhancement. The 2nd instance concerns the analysis of efficiency and equity statements in a society where we have heterogenous agents. Specifically, we want to analyse how the redistributive penchants of the authorities modify the efficiency statements. After comparing societal public assistance in both instances individually we will seek to happen decisions for societal public assistance by comparing the two instances with each other. Subsequently we will calculate societal public assistance in instance of a budget neutrality unvarying VAT rate of 15,26 % computed by the CPB.[ 13 ]To acquire a complete analysis and particularly imitate a more existent state of affairs we will execute a hardiness analysis. Some comparative alterations will be applied to the exogenic parametric quantities in order to see how societal public assistance alterations.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides the theoretical model about optimum ingestion revenue enhancements and the current revenue enhancement system in The Netherlands. Section 3 describes the CONSTAX theoretical account and the research attack. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis. Section 5 describes the hardiness analysis. The chief findings are presented in subdivision 6.
2 Theoretical model
2.1 Theory of optimum ingestion revenue enhancements
This paper focuses on the optimum ingestion revenue enhancements. In general an optimum revenue enhancement system refers to a revenue enhancement policy that minimizes the dead weight loss in an economic system.[ 14 ]The theory of optimum ingestion revenue enhancements implies that a revenue enhancement system should be chosen to maximise societal public assistance, under the restraint that outgos can non transcend grosss. Ramsey[ 15 ]set about the first analysis of additive revenue enhancements on trade goods. He ignored the tradeoff between efficiency and equity. His survey investigated the optimum revenue enhancement system when the authorities should raise a given sum of revenue enhancement grosss at the least distortionary cost in an economic system with homogenous agents by taxing trade goods merely. He derived the inverse-elasticity regulation. This means that goods with price-inelastic demand should be taxed higher than goods with a price-elastic demand in order to minimise deformations caused by the ingestion revenue enhancement. Corlett and Hague[ 16 ]analyzed the state of affairs where two ingestion goods are taxed at a unvarying rate and asked whether a distinction in revenue enhancement rates could better efficiency. They found that unvarying revenue enhancement rates are optimum if all goods have the same grade of complementarity with leisure. But if that is non the instance, efficiency could be improved by taxing goods that are complements ( or least substitutable ) to leisure comparatively high and goods that are complements to labour comparatively low. This leads to a lessening of ingestion of leisure and increase labour supply. Heady[ 17 ]investigated the relationship between the consequences of the Ramsey- and Corlett and Hague regulation. He found that the good that is most complementary to leisure is the good with the most price-inelastic demand. This confirms that the consequences are consistent in picking the same good to be most to a great extent taxed.
Diamond and Mirrlees[ 18 ]undertook the analysis of optimum trade good revenue enhancement in an economic system with heterogenous agents. In the baseline of his theoretical account persons differ in their ability to gain income. Under the premise of independent demands, they found that the optimum revenue enhancement rate on trade goods depends on the opposite of its monetary value snap of demand and on the income snap. The income snap shows how the proportion of the income spends on a good alteration as income rises. The significance of their findings can be seen when we take into history that many goods with low monetary value snap ‘s of demand besides have low income snap ‘s. If we look at the demand for necessities we find that these are non antiphonal to alterations in monetary value or income. From an efficiency point of position we should revenue enhancement these necessities more to a great extent, but from an equity point of position ( i.e. redistribution statements from the authorities ) we should revenue enhancement these goods lower. This is the tradeoff between efficiency and equity. Atkinson and Stiglitz[ 19 ]studied whether differentiated revenue enhancements on ingestion are desirable alongside a progressive income revenue enhancement as portion of a redistributive revenue enhancement system. In this theoretical account persons merely differ in their incomes and non in their implicit in penchants. The Atkinson and Stiglitz Theorem province if families ‘ public-service corporation maps are dissociable in ingestion of goods and leisure, differential trade good taxed should non be used. In their analysis of a redistributive revenue enhancement system the ball amount transportation to all persons played an indispensable function. Under the premise that all goods are normal, lower income groups benefit more by an addition in the ball amount transportation than by a cut down in ingestion revenue enhancements. This implies that from an equity point of position lump amount transportations are the best to accomplish authorities ‘s redistributive motivations. If we have chosen an optimum ball amount transportation, the inquiry whether to hold a differentiated revenue enhancement on ingestion is merely focused on efficiency.[ 20 ]This leads us to the Corlett and Hague regulation. If we put a higher revenue enhancement on a good that is more consumed by persons that spend more clip on leisure, it is apparent that leisure becomes more expensive. Persons get inducements to increase labour supply. In contrast, if we put a lower revenue enhancement on a good that is more consumed by persons who work more, persons besides get inducements to increase labour supply.
2.2 VAT system in The Netherlands
In general there are two statements in favour of a differentiated VAT rate. The first statement is that the VAT rate could be used as a tool for redistribution. However the Studiecommissie Belastingstelsel[ 21 ]and Jacobs[ 22 ]shows us that this statement is weak and ca n’t keep. The current differentiated VAT system with a decreased VAT rate is introduced for certain basic demands that have a comparatively big portion in all the necessary outgos for lower income groups. Crawford, Keen and Smith[ 23 ]shows that it is so the instance that lower income groups spend a higher proportion of their income on such points as nutrient than do the better off. But even if the better off spend a smaller proportion of their income on them, they are more likely to pass a larger absolute sum on such goods. Jacobs[ 24 ]shows us that VAT distinction could be justified on the footing of redistributive ends. However, this statement merely holds if the authorities is limited in puting the income revenue enhancement ( e.g. level revenue enhancement ) . He states that with a non-linear income revenue enhancement extra public assistance costs in footings of distorted ingestion are avoided without abandon the redistributive ends of the authorities. Therefore, VAT distinction provides no greater chances for redistribution than would be possible with a non-linear income revenue enhancement. The 2nd statement follows from the Corlett and Hague regulation[ 25 ]and Atkinson and Stiglitz Theorem[ 26 ]. From the goods[ 27 ]covered by a decreased VAT rate in The Netherlands, it is non evident that the Corlett and Hague statement played an of import function in the execution of differentiated VAT rates. Another statement is that differentiated VAT rates distort the ingestion form of persons. Persons consume more goods that are taxed at a decreased rate of 6 % , which leads to efficiency losingss. This demonstrates the potency of a unvarying revenue enhancement in The Netherlands.
3 Model
3.1 Theoretical theoretical account
We use the CONSTAX-model to analyse the societal public assistance effects of a unvarying revenue enhancement rate. In this theoretical account there are two relevant parties: persons and the authorities.
Persons derive public-service corporation from ingestion of leisure, good 1 and good 2. Taking this into history persons maximize their public-service corporation by taking the figure of hours they desire to work and the combination of ingestion between good 1 and good 2 topic to their family budget restraint.
The public-service corporation map of an person is given by:
U = U ( c1 – , I• ( c2- , 1- ) )
The specification of the public-service corporation map will be specified as a ‘nested CES ‘ public-service corporation map:
The ingestion of good 1 is given by c1 and the ingestion of good 2 by c2. Good 1 refers to necessities and good 2 refers to normal goods i.e. all other goods. Both c1 and c2 are endogenous parametric quantities. The value of these parametric quantities will be determined through the theoretical account. In our theoretical account we assume that persons must devour a certain sum of good 1 and good 2. Therefore we have a minimal demand of ingestion of both goods which is given by the exogenic parametric quantities and. Since we denoted c1 as necessities, we assume that irrespectively the penchant of persons or their expendable income, a minimal sum of c1 must be consumed. This premise is non valid for c2. Since these are non necessities we assume that an person does non hold to buy any sum of good 2. Therefore the minimal requirement ingestion of good 2 is 0 in our theoretical account. In rule minimal requirement ingestion of good 1 is set at 0.05, because families should hold adequate money to devour other goods.
An person has 24 hours to pass on a twenty-four hours. He spends these hours either on working or on leisure. denotes the figure of hours an single spends working, so that ( 1- ) is the hours that an person will pass on leisure. The snap of permutation between ingestion of good 2 ( c2 ) and leisure ( 1- ) is indicated as. The snap of permutation indicates how easy it is to replace ingestion of good 2 for leisure. We besides have the snap of permutation between the ingestion of good 1 ( c1 ) and the complex of the ingestion of good 2 ( c2 ) and leisure ( 1- ) , which is indicated as This snap indicates how easy it is to replace ingestion of good 1 and the complex of ingestion of good 2 and leisure.
The portions of ingestion of good 1 and ingestion of good 2 are determined by and, severally. These parametric quantities represent the per centum of family income that is spend on devouring goods 1 and 2. The value of these parametric quantities is based on informations provided by a publication of the State Secretary of Financial Affairs[ 28 ]. The estimated value for the portion of income spend on good 1 is 0,36 and the portion of income spend on good 2 is 0,64[ 29 ]. For an overview of the informations used to gauge these parametric quantities we refer to appendix 1. We are cognizant that the portion of goods in the entire budget of persons can differ for the several income categories. Persons who have more income are expected to hold a larger portion of their income spend on certain goods. Despite of this construct and for simpleness grounds we will presume that there is no different in the portion of income spend on good 1 and 2 between the different income categories.
The I? , , and are exogenic parametric quantities. We used the convergent thinker map in the excel spreadsheet to find the value of these parametric quantities. With the remunerated snap of labour supply[ 30 ]and the remunerated monetary value snap of good 1[ 31 ]we can happen the value of these parametric quantities by minimising the quadratic difference between the theoretical account value and the mark value. We found the undermentioned values for these parametric quantities:
Parameters public-service corporation map
I?
0.61
0.46
0.15
0.47
The income of an single consists of labour income ( 1-l and a ball amount transportation ( T ) by the authorities. The labour income an single earns depends on his ability ( ) . After labour revenue enhancement has been deducted the single receives a net labour income. As we assume that an single spends all his income on the ingestion of good 1 and good 2, so is the income of an single equivalent to the ingestion of both goods. So, the maximal ingestion of both goods equals the income of the person. The family budget restraint is given by:
( 1- I„ ) nln + T = ( 1+t1 ) c1 + ( 1+ t2 ) c2
Persons maximize their public-service corporation under the limitation that it is non possible to pass more than what they have on income. That is why they maximize their public-service corporation topic to their family budget restraint. For simpleness we will put a fiction of full-time income If which is the income an person will gain if he spends all his clip on labour. With this premise we can rewrite the family budget restraint. The undermentioned restraint gives the full-time income If, which is spend on leisure, ingestion of goods 1 and 2.
If a‰? ( 1- I„ ) + T = ( 1- I„ ) ( 1- ln ) + ( 1+t1 ) c1 + ( 1+t2 ) c2
In our theoretical account we besides have the authorities who wants to maximise societal public assistance and has four policy instruments at its scope. These are two ingestion revenue enhancements ( t1 and t2 ) , a labour income revenue enhancement ( ) and a lump-sum transportation ( T ) . The societal public assistance is given by the amount of all single public-service corporations and depends on whether we have a representative person or a heterogenous person. In instance of heterogenous persons the authorities besides takes redistributive statements into history.
The societal public assistance map is given by:
The Atkinson-coefficient of inequality antipathy is symbolized by. = 0 and = a?z are the two bounds, i.e. respectively authorities does non care about redistribution ( Utilitarian ) and authorities merely cares about redistribution ( Rawlsian ) . Aristei and Perugini[ 32 ]performed a normative multidimensional analysis on the penchants for redistribution and inequality for 26 European states. Their theoretical account was based on Evans[ 33 ], which means that the inequality antipathy is observed by the societal values of the authorities as shown by their economic policy design. They found an inequality antipathy of 1.456 for The Netherlands, which is important at the 1 % degree. This is besides the value that we will utilize for our theoretical account. Overall, their consequences for 26 European states fall within a scope of values that is considered as economically sensible, i.e. between 1 and 2 ( see Lambert, Millimet and Slottje )[ 34 ].
In our theoretical account the authorities wants to maximise the societal public assistance under the limitation of budget neutrality. As a affair of class the GBC a‰§ 0, it can non hold a negative value. The authorities budget restraint is given by:
In this restraint we see that the authorities gets its gross by taxing labour income and the ingestion on good 1 ( t1 ) and good 2 ( t2 ) and this gross is given on the left-hand side.
For our research we take the mean initial income revenue enhancement as fraction of gross pay in the Netherlands which is estimated at 37 %[ 35 ]. When we take the labours costs of the employer into history we found an mean initial income revenue enhancement as fraction of the labours costs has a value of 0.44.[ 36 ]BRON
The right-hand side denotes the outgo of the authorities, which is the ball amount transportation ( T ) and a minimal gross demand E.
The minimal gross demand E has been estimated by taking the norm of informations provided by the World Development Indicators. Stern ( 1976 )[ 37 ]believes that a good estimate for this parametric quantity is the authorities expenditures on goods and services. Therefore we took the disbursals of the authorities in per centum of the GDP. The estimated value for this parametric quantity is 0.4 %[ 38 ].
When all exogenic parametric quantities has been entered in the excel spreadsheet, it becomes clear that the authorities budget restraint is positive. This implies that the authorities has pecuniary resources for optimising the societal public assistance. To make the optimum societal public assistance the authorities will return gross to the families in the signifier of a ball amount transportation. Excel gives us the value of 0,17 for T, which we will utilize as our baseline value.
The baseline for the low-level formattings is as follows:
Low-level formattings
Initial revenue enhancement rate labour income ( I„ )
0.44
Initial revenue enhancement rate good 1 ( t1 )
0.06
Initial revenue enhancement rate good 2 ( t2 )
0.09
Initial ball amount ( T )
0.17[ 39 ]
3.2 Research attack
We simulate the CONSTAX-model for The Netherlands, by usage of an excel spreadsheet, which contains the parametric quantities and the restraints listed in our theoretical account. The aim is to happen authorities instruments and other results in the optimum at which public assistance is maximized and compare it to a state of affairs that most closely represents the current system in The Netherlands. The analysis of societal public assistance is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Efficiency refers to a revenue enhancement system that minimizes the dead weight loss in an economic system. Equity means that those benefits are distributed uniformly among persons.[ 40 ]We use the theoretical theoretical account to supply a numerical illustration for The Netherlands, such that you can make policy experiments with the simulation. The simulation might give an indicant what would go on in the existent universe if the authorities decides to alter the revenue enhancement construction to a unvarying VAT rate.
The research inquiry will be answered by analysing two instances. Each of these instances will incorporate a comparing of the societal public assistance between taxing ingestion goods at differentiated VAT rates ( the current revenue enhancement system in the Netherlands ) with regard to taxing goods at a unvarying VAT rate. The comparing will be processed in two stairss. First, the societal public assistance will be calculated if good 1 is being taxed at 6 % and good 2 at 19 % . By make fulling these revenue enhancement rates into the simulation theoretical account together with the exogenic parametric quantities mentioned in the theoretical theoretical account ( in the theoretical theoretical account we will happen a value for the societal public assistance. This will be our baseline in each instance. Subsequently, we will calculate an optimum revenue enhancement rate with the convergent thinker in Excel. Before we can give an reply if a unvarying VAT rate is desirable in each instance, we will besides calculate the societal public assistance in instance of a unvarying 15, 26 % VAT rate. This is the budget neutrality rate of the VAT computed by the CPB[ 41 ]. The instances used for the analysis are as follows.
Case 1 concerns the analysis of efficiency statements entirely in a society where we have a homogenous agent. This means that each person has the same earning ability ( n ) and has hence the same sum of income ( nl ) . Besides, their determination on ingestion does non differ. Equity statements will be ignored in this specific instance, because in a homogenous society there is no demand to redistribute. We foremost want to do an analysis from an efficiency point of position, because this reflects the extra load of a alteration in revenue enhancement rates. In this instance it would non count which sort of authorities ( Utilitarian or Rawlsian ) is taking. Besides the ball amount transportation ( T ) can non be seen as a policy instrument of the authorities, because this instrument does non hold efficiency costs. In the absence of redistributive motivations it will merely be used for garnering revenue enhancement grosss. In instance 2 the analysis will be done from an efficiency and equity point of position. Specifically, we will analyse how equity arguments modify the efficiency 1s. The chief premise in this instance is that persons differ in their earning ability ( n ) ; there is a heterogenous society. Agents with higher net incomes ability generate a higher income to pass on ingestion of good 1 and 2. Equity statements are related to the redistributive penchants of the authorities, i.e. it can be a Rawlsian or Utilitarian or between those two. The Atkinson-coefficient of inequality antipathy ( I? ) symbolizes these penchants. As said before, we will presume that the Dutch authorities has a I? with a value of 1.456.
An of import premise we make by replying our research inquiry is that we assume I„ is fixed. The revenue enhancement on labour income is fixed because taxing goods at a unvarying rate is tantamount to impose a revenue enhancement on labour income. As said above, the value of is 0,44.
This is because we chiefly want to compare the two instances by adding the heterogeneity, i.e. altering the gaining ability of the person. Since the authorities excludes T as his policy instrument in instance 1, we will besides follow this in instance 2. After comparing the societal public assistance in both instances individually we will seek to happen decisions for the societal public assistance by comparing the two instances with each other. To acquire a complete analysis and particularly imitate a more existent state of affairs we will besides execute a robust analysis. Some comparative alterations will be applied to the exogenic parametric quantities, so we can see how the societal public assistance alterations. At the terminal the different results from this robust analysis will be presented diagrammatically. After these stairss we will be able to do decisions for instance 1 and instance 2.
4. Analysis
4.1 CASE 1: Homogeneous agent
In instance 1we did an analysis of the societal public assistance under the premise that there is no difference between persons. Each person has the same penchants and sum of income. The analysis has been done with values which should use to a representative agent. At the first topographic point the value of the initial societal public assistance has been computed by excel. Therefore we used the baseline parametric quantities described in the old chapter. [ WAARDE VOOR SWF? ] In the baseline we found that the optimal duties of t1 and t2 to maximise societal public assistance is severally 16 % and 14 % .
The 2nd measure in our analysis is to maximise the societal public assistance by altering t1 and t2 under the restraint that GBC is a‰? 0. In order to acquire insight in the hardiness of the simulation we need to change the undermentioned parametric quantities: the remunerated snap of labour supply, the remunerated monetary value snap of good and the minimal demand for c1.
Robustness analysis
We found that the revenue enhancement on good 1 increased from 6 % to 16 % and that the revenue enhancement on good 2 decreased from 19 % to 14 % . When we look at the cross monetary value snap of good 1 and labour and traverse monetary value snap of good 2 and labour we find that an addition of 1 % in labour revenue enhancement leads to a larger lessening in good 2, than in good 1. This implies that good 2 is more complementary to labour supply than good 1. Based on the Corlett and Hague regulation we should revenue enhancement good 1 more to a great extent than good 2. If we look at the monetary value snap of good 1, we found that a lower mark value leads to an addition in revenue enhancement on good 1. This implies that the more inelastic good 1 is, the more we should revenue enhancement good 1. This is in line with the Ramsey regulation. We conclude that the revenue enhancement on good 1 should increase and that the revenue enhancement on good 2 should diminish, but it is non decidedly that a unvarying duty is desirable to maximise societal public assistance.
Table 1: hardiness analysis by altering belastingelasticiteit
Own-price cubic decimeter
t1
t2
Target value
-0.2
0.44
0.22
-0.3
0.31
0.22
-0.4 ( baseline )
0.16
0.14
-0.5
0.12
0.11
-0.6
0.07
0.07
Table 2: Robustness analysis by altering monetary value snap of good 1
Own-price c1 t1
t1
t2
Target value
-0.3
0.34
0.02
-0.4
0.23
0.09
-0.5 ( baseline )
0.15
0.14
-0.6
0.11
0.17
-0.7
0.09
0.20
4.2 CASE 2: Heterogeneous agents
Appendixs
APPENDIX 1: Shares of ingestion
Consumption expendituresA of householdsA classified byA VATA groupsA 2005 ( a‚¬ million ) A
Duty 2007A
A
A
A
A
A
Entire
Which
A
A
A
excl. VAT
exempted
6 %
19 %
Food and drink
30 922
–
24 532
6 390
Food
19 852
–
19 306
546
Potatos, veggies and fruit
3 647
–
3 647
–
Meats
4 952
–
4 952
–
Fish
842,00
–
842
–
Dairy
3 438
–
3 438
–
Bread, biscuits and staff of life merchandises
2 320
–
2 320
–
Other nutrient
4 653
–
4 107
546,00
Beverage
11 070
–
5 226
5 844
Ice pick
227,00
–
227
–
Confectionary
3 030
–
3 030
–
Drinks
4 337
–
1 969
2 368
Tobacco
3 476
–
–
3 476
Durable ingestion goods
38 522
95
352
38 075
Fabrics and vesture
8 823
–
–
8 823
Leather merchandises and places
2 109
–
–
2 109
Home ornament
6 011
–
241
5 770
Family contraptions
4 722
–
–
4 722
Family articles
2 077
–
–
2 077
Vehicles
7 064
–
–
7 064
Other lasting goods
7 716
95
111
7 510
Other goods
29 512
–
8 198
21 314
Motor fuels
7 780
–
–
7 780
Energy
8 440
–
1 151
7 289
Other goods
13 292
–
7 047
6 245
Servicess
124 678
81 851
17 363
25 464
Housing
40 518
37 187
82
3 249
Catering services
11 489
–
8 703
2 786
Recreational and cultural services
5 198
2 177
2 394
627
Conveyance and communicating services
16 962
3 399
4 163
9 400
Medical services
13 190
13 190
–
–
Financial and concern services
24 941
22 033
–
2 908
Other services
12 380
3 865
2 021
6 494
Consumption by all families in The Netherlands
223 634
81 946
50 445
91 243
A
A
A
A
A
Share
A
0,36
0,23
0,41
Mention: State Secretary of Financial Affairs DV2008/0001010
APPENDIX 2: Expenses authorities
Year
Expenses % GDP
2000
39.3
2001
39.7
2002
40.1
2003
41.1
2004
40.4
2005
39.3
2006
40.4
2007
40.2
2008
40.5
Mention: hypertext transfer protocol: //data.worldbank.org
